Building an infrastructure project performance in the North-West Province Department of Public Works and Roads by Murwira, Davison & Bekker, Michiel
128
Oorsigsartikels • Review articles
Building an infrastructure 
project performance in 
the North-West Province 
Department of Public 
Works and Roads
Peer reviewed and revised
Abstract
Building and infrastructure projects at the North-
West Province Department of Public Works and 
Roads (NW DPWR) often perform poorly in terms of 
overrunning both the original approved timeline 
and the budget. Adding to poor time and cost 
performances, these projects often do not meet 
the desired functional requirements. This article 
reports on findings of a study which investigated 
the causes of these poor performances in 
the NW DPWR. Fifty potential causes of poor 
performance were identified from literature. 
These factors were grouped under three main 
related categories of owner-related, contractor-
related and consultant-related and were 
subjected to a questionnaire survey to identify 
the most critical causes of failure. The results 
were analysed using the Relative Importance 
Index (RII) and Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
Coefficients. The results indicated that the 
most significant causes of poor building and 
infrastructure project performance in the NW 
DPWR include underestimation of project cost, 
the lack of experience in executing projects, 
contractor’s cash-flow constraints, corruption 
and bribery during the bidding and contract 
award phase, as well as poor site management 
and supervision. Recommendations are made 
to prevent similar causes of projects failure in the 
NW DPWR in future.
Keywords: Building, construction projects, cost 
overruns, infrastructure, project performance, 
Relative Importance Index, schedule delays 
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Abstrak
Bou- en infrastruktuurprojekte by die Noordwes Provinsie se Departement van 
Openbare Werke en Paaie (NW DPWR) ondervind gereeld tydvertragings in 
projekvoltooiing sowel as probleme soos oorspandering en die gebrek aan 
voldoening aan funksionele spesifikasies. Hierdie artikel rapporteer resultate van 
’n studie wat onderneem is ten einde die redes waarom projekte in die NW 
DPWR swak presteer, te ondersoek. Vanuit literatuur is vyftig potensiële redes vir 
projekfaling geïdentifiseer. Die redes is in drie verwante kategorieë gegroepeer, 
naamlik eienaarverwante, kontrakteurverwante en konsultantverwante 
kategorieë. Deur middel van ’n vraelysopname is die mees kritieke redes 
vir projekfaling geïdentifiseer. Die resulate is ontleed deur gebruik te maak 
van ’n Relatiewe Sterkte Indeks asook die Spearman Rangorde Korrelasie 
Koëffisiënte. Die resultate toon dat die mees beduidende redes vir projekfaling 
in NW DPWR sluit onderberaming van projekkoste, gebrekkige ervaring in 
projekimplementering, beperkte kontantvloei deur kontrakteurs, korrupsie 
en omkopery tydens die tenderproses en kontrakaanstellings, sowel as swak 
terreinbestuur en toesig in. Aanbevelings is gemaak om soortgelyke probleme 
met toekomstige projekte in die NW DPWR te beperk.
Sleutelwoorde: Gebou, konstruksieprojekte, koste-oorskryding, infrastruktuur, 
projekprestasie, Relative Importance Index, skedulevertragings
1. Introduction
The North-West Provincial Government (NWPG) has a constitutional 
responsibility to provide better services to the people of the North-
West Province. The NWPG, through the Department of Public Works 
and Roads (DPWR), is mandated to provide office, residential and 
other service delivery facilities to provincial departments and political 
office-bearers. The initial policy of the NW DPWR, in full support of 
the objectives and targets of the government’s Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP), is to ensure that all South 
Africans have access to basic infrastructure (RDP, 1994: online). The 
Chief Directorate Infrastructure in the Department is responsible 
for infrastructure planning, design and project implementation 
of infrastructure assets to meet the needs identified by the client 
departments under the capital expansion (Capex) programme. 
The implementation of projects by the NW DPWR is based on the 
North-West Infrastructure Delivery Management System (NW IDMS), 
which provides a systematic approach to infrastructure delivery, 
covering the full life cycle from needs identification, planning and 
budgeting to procurement, construction, handover, operations 
and maintenance.
The NW DPWR often perform poorly in the delivery of all construction 
and maintenance projects on time, within budget and in accordance 
to the pre-determined requirements. A study undertaken by the 
South African Government in 2002 to determine the issues and gaps 
in the delivery of infrastructure reported that there was a shortfall in 
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effective and systematic delivery systems, as well as a shortage in 
skills to deliver projects as per requirements (SAICE, 2016: 2). The most 
critical problems facing Government’s infrastructure service delivery 
programme are the following:
• Delayed infrastructure investment, also known as the ‘blocked 
infrastructure project pipeline’, often due to inadequate 
planning allocation of resources, as well as excessive 
bureaucracy;
• Infrastructure delivery backlogs, particularly in respect of 
buildings infrastructure;
• Budgetary challenges in addressing backlogs in infrastructure 
delivery;
• Inheritance of unequal spatial distribution of infrastructure 
resulting in rural areas with limited access to basic, social and 
economic services;
• Underspending of capital expenditure;
• Poor application of project management practices, and
• Poor time management.
The South African Government has identified infrastructure 
development as a means to stimulate the economy (NPC, 
2011: 137). The Government is the most significant construction 
client, contributing between 40% and 50% of the entire domestic 
construction expenditure (Dlungwana, Nxumalo, Van Huysteen, 
Rwelamila & Noyana, 2002: 2). According to Ramokolo and 
Smallwood (2008: 46), South Africa aims to invest 5.1% of South 
Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in construction. They also 
indicated that 45% of the more than 500,000 people, employed in 
the construction industry, are estimated to be working in the formal 
sector. In order to address infrastructure backlogs across the country, 
the Government is committed to invest in infrastructure development 
in order to achieve economic growth and address the backlog.
Approximately 60% of the projects being implemented by the NW 
DPWR are not completed on time and on budget, often resulting 
in service delivery protests by local communities. In a bid to get to 
uncover some of the problems experienced in the delivery of building 
infrastructure projects by the NW DPWR, a preliminary internal 
evaluation and analysis of project performances and operational 
deficiencies in the NW DPWR was done. It was evident that there 
were various challenges facing the NW DPWR in delivering building 
and infrastructure projects, including termination of contractors for 
poor performance, cost and schedule overruns on projects such as 
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Vryburg Mini Garona Office Park, Vryburg Hospital, and DPWR Head 
Office in Mmabatho. These problems were further exacerbated 
by poor procurement practices and poor controls in the delivery 
process. Despite overall poor performance, some projects were 
delivered successfully, namely Tlakgameng Community Library, new 
hostels at Bophelong Special School, and Tlou le Tlou Traditional 
Offices. The discrepancies in overall project performance prompted 
the researcher to investigate and identify the causes of infrastructure 
project failures in the NW DPWR.
This study aims to address the following three questions related to 
projects at NW DPWR:
• What are the general factors causing the time and cost 
overrun of building and infrastructure projects?
• What are the critical factors causing the time and cost 
overrun of building and infrastructure projects?
• What are the perceptions of owners, contractors and 
consultants regarding the causes of time and cost overrun of 
building and infrastructure projects?
2. Literature survey
Construction projects worldwide often suffer from poor performance 
in terms of time delays, cost overruns and quality defects. Pheng 
and Chuan (cited in Adebowale & Ayodeji, 2015: 1118) stated that, 
traditionally, successful delivery of a construction project hinges 
on the performance of the project manager, who must consider 
delivery time, budgeted cost and expected quality. However, with 
the delivery of projects predominantly a team effort, the allocation 
of single accountability for project performance to one individual 
might not achieve the desired results.
In the past, various studies investigated and analysed factors causing 
poor performance on construction-related projects (Table 1). The 
majority of these studies focused on identifying the major causes of 
time and schedule overruns, challenges facing contractors, as well as 
quality management in various construction projects. Table 1 provides 
a summary of some of the common causes for poor performance of 
construction-related projects as per categories identified.
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Assaf & Al-Hejji (2006: 349); Frimpong, Oluwoye & 
Crawford (2003: 321); Fugar & Agyakwah-Baah 
(2010: 111); Mansfield, Ugwu & Doran (1994: 254); Odeh 
& Battaineh (2002: 67); Sambasivan & Soon (2007: 526); 
Sweis, Sweis, Hammad & Shboul (2008: 671)
Owner’s cash-flow 
problems 
Al-Momani (2000: 51); Assaf & Al-Hejji (2006: 349); 
Kaliba, Muya & Mumba (2009: 522); Koushki, Al-Rashid 
& Kartam (2005: 294); Monyane & Okumbe (2012: 192); 
Sweis et al. (2008: 671)
Scope changes from 
owner
Al-Momani (2000); Assaf & Al-Hejji (2006: 349); Kaliba 
et al. (2009: 522); Koushki et al. (2005: 294); Monyane & 
Okumbe (2012: 192); Sweis et al. (2008: 671)
Delays in 
decision-making
Chan & Kumaraswamy (1997: 55); Monyane & Okumbe 
(2012: 192)
Contractor-related factors
Inadequate and poor 
planning
Assaf & Al-Hejji (2006: 349); Dlungwana, Nxumalo, 
Van Huysteen, Rwelamila & Noyana (2002: 25-26); 
Sambasivan & Soon (2007: 526); Sweis et al. (2008: 671)
Contractor’s financial 
difficulties
Aibinu & Odeyinka (2006: 667-677); Frimpong et al. 
(2003: 321); Sweis et al. (2008: 671)
Shortage of skilled 
labour
Baloyi & Bekker (2011: 63); Dlungwana et al. 
(2002: 25-26); Sweis et al. (2008: 671); Thwala & Phaladi 
(2009: 533)
Poor site management 
and supervision
Assaf & Al-Hejji (2006: 349); Chan & Kumaraswamy 




Dlakwa & Culpin (1990: 239); Fugar & Agyakwah-Baah 
(2010: 111); Mansfield et al. (1994: 254); Thwala & 
Phaladi, (2009: 535)
Lack of experience in 
executing projects
Koushki (2005: 294); Muhwezi, Acai & Otim (2014: 21); 
Nguyen & Chileshe (2015: 398); Sambasivan & Soon 
(2007: 526); Thwala & Phaladi (2009: 533)
Increase in material cost Baloyi & Bekker (2011: 62); Dlakwa & Culpin (1990: 239); Koushki et al. (2005: 294); Mansfield et al. (1994: 254)
Consultant-related factors
Poor design capacity 
and design changes
Al-Momani (2000: 51); Baloyi & Bekker (2011: 63); 
Jackson (2002: 4); Nguyen & Chileshe (2015: 398); 
Muhwezi et al. (2014: 13-23)
Incomplete designs 
by architect and 
engineering disciplines
Aibinu & Odeyinka (2006: 667-677); Baloyi & Bekker 
(2011: 63); KPMG International (2013: 4); Muhwezi et al. 
(2014: 13-23)
Architect’s incomplete 
drawing Aibinu & Odeyinka (2006: 675)
Design error made by 
the designers
Muhwezi et al. (2014: 13-23); Tumi, Omran & Pakir 
(2009: 268)
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3. Research methodology
Due to the number of projects and stakeholders involved, it was 
decided to conduct a quantitative research design rather than a 
qualitative approach. As stated by Cooper and Schindler (1998: 21), 
a questionnaire survey assists with the standardisation of data 
gathering, decreases non-response errors and increases response 
rates. The number of people and entities participating in NW DPWR 
projects are numerous, and it is believed that the inputs and views 
of as many participants as possible will be valuable to objectively 
identify the key factor that leads to poor project performance. The 
structured survey questionnaire invitations were sent via e-mail. For this 
investigation, an e-mail distribution method offered the opportunity 
to access a bigger group of potential research participants.
3.1 Sampling method
A list of 310 approved consultants (258) and contractors (52) were 
obtained from the internal NW DPWR procurement database. This 
database is merely a list of consultants and contractors that are 
eligible to work for the Department and contains the contact their 
names, telephone numbers and email addresses. A total of 258 
consultants were listed in the database and included architects, 
civil and structural engineers, electrical engineers, mechanical 
engineers, and quantity surveyors. A total of 52 contractor names 
were retrieved. Introductory letters and questionnaires were sent to 
all companies listed.
Owner participants included employees from NW DPWR who 
interfaced directly with consultants and contractors on projects and 
had the mandate to provide managerial and technical guidance on 
the projects as well as approve or disapprove project deliverables. A 
total of 45 project owner participants were identified to participate. 
A simple random sampling selecting method resulted in a sample 
size of 355, representing project owners (45), contractors (52), and 
consultants (258).
3.2 Data collection
A structured questionnaire was distributed electronically, via email, to 
a total randomly selected sample of 355 project owners, contractors 
and consultants involved in building construction projects under the 
NW DPWR Infrastructure Chief Directorate in South Africa. The major 
causes of construction projects failure in the NW DPWR topics listed 
in the questionnaire were extracted from reviews of the literature, 
resulting in the formulation of a questionnaire divided into two 
Acta Structilia 2017: 24(2)
134
sections, namely the respondent’s profile, and a ranking list of the 
50 critical project failure factors where respondents were requested 
to rank each of the 50 critical project failure factors. The profile 
section consisted of questions pertaining to general demographics 
about the respondents. It was divided into three subsections: Type 
of organisation owner, consultant or contractor; the respondent’s 
designation, and the professional experience of each respondent. 
To reduce the respondent’s biasness, and facilitate coding of the 
questionnaire, closed-ended questions were preferred (Akintoye & 
Main, 2007: 601). 
3.3 Response rate
A total of 100 validly completed responses were received, representing 
a response rate of 28.2%. According to Moyo & Crafford (2010: 68), 
contemporary built-environment survey response rates range from 
7% to 40% in general. It is significant in respect of the reliability of the 
response rate that, although the number of questionnaires distributed 
to consultants seems disproportionally high, the response rate from 
this category was relatively low, thus not causing any bias towards 
the results. The questionnaire return rate is provided in Table 2.
Table 2: Questionnaire return rate
Respondents Questionnaires distributed Responses returned Response rate (%)
Owner 45 30 66.67
Contractors 52 26 50.00
Consultants 258 44 17.05
Total 355 100 28
3.4	 Data	analysis	and	interpretation	of	findings
A 5-point Likert scale was used to measure the opinions of the 
respondents. Likert-type or frequency scales use fixed choice 
response formats and are designed to measure attitudes or opinions 
(Bowling, 1997; Burns & Grove, 1997). For the purpose of analysis and 
interpretation, the following scale measurement was used: 1 - no 
contribution to failure; 2 - slight contribution to failure; 3 - significant 
contribution to failure; 4 - very significant contribution to failure, and 
5 - major cause of project failure. From this general data, each of 
the 50 critical project failure factors could be ranked from having 
no, slightly, significant, very significant or major contribution to 
project failure.
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To interpret the general data, a combination of the following three 
descriptive statistical analysis methods was used:
• Relative Importance Index (RII);
• Spearman’s Rank Correlation (rs), and
• Probability values (p-values).
3.4.1 Relative Importance Index
The Relative Importance Index (RII) is commonly used to 
assess comparative results from research in the field of project 
performance (Aibinu & Odeyinka, 2006; Baloyi & Bekker, 2011; Chan 
& Kumaraswamy, 1997; Kikwasi, 2012; Muhwezi et al., 2014). For this 
study, RII was used to determine the ranking of different causes of 
building construction projects failure from the point of view of owners, 
contractors and consultants.
RII = ∑ W ∕ (A x N), (0 ≤ RII ≤ 1) (1)
Where:
W = the weight given to each factor by the respondents and ranges 
from 1 to 5 as per the Likert scale.
A = is the highest weight (i.e. 5 in this case).
N = is the total number of respondents.
The cause with the highest index is the most important, and with the 
smallest number the least important. The rankings made it possible to 
cross-compare the failure factors as perceived by the three groups 
of respondents.
3.4.2 Spearman’s Rank Correlation
This study used the Spearman’s Rank Correlation (rs) to identify and 
test the strength of a relationship between the rankings of any two 
parties for a single failure cause, while ignoring the ranking of the 
third party (Assaf & Al-Heijj, 2006; Fugar & Agyakwah-Baah, 2010; 
Odeh & Battaineh, 2002). The correlation coefficients are calculated 
using the following formula (2):
rs = 1-
6∑d2
(n3 - n)  .......................................................................................... (2)
Where:
rs = Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient.
d = the difference in ranking between any two parties.
n = the number of causes of failure, which in this case is 50.
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The correlation coefficient varies between +1, which implies a 
perfect positive correlation (agreement) and -1, which implies a 
perfect negative correlation (disagreement). Values close to unity in 
magnitude imply good correlation, whereas those near zero indicate 
little or no correlation (Assaf & Al-Heijji, 2006). When r = 0, it means 
that there is no correlation (Assaf & Al-Heijji, 2006).
3.4.3 Probability values
The p-value is the probability of observing a sample value as extreme 
as, or more extreme than the value actually observed, given that 
the null hypothesis is true (Kamanga & Steyn, 2013: 82). To determine 
whether the parties displayed significant agreement in their rankings, 
the null hypothesis stated as owner and contractors, contractors and 
consultants, and owner and consultants do not agree on ranking of 
the causes of construction projects failure in the NW DPWR was tested 
at a 95% confidence level (2 tailed tests). The p-value indicates if the 
correlation is statistically significant. The analysis was aided by the use 
of MoonStats statistical software.
4. Results
4.1 Relative Importance Index
Table 3 shows a complete set of the survey results illustrating the RII as 
well as the ranking order where 1 shows the factors contributing the 
most to failure.
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Table 3: Overall RII and rank of construction projects failure 
according to owner, contractors and consultants
ID Causes of failure
Owner Contractors Consultants All parties
RII Rank RII Rank RII Rank Average RII Rank
Owner-related factors
1 Late payment of completed works 0.759 13 0.792 7 0.682 28 0.744 16
2 Owner’s cash-flow problems or non-access to funds constraints 0.753 14 0.769 13 0.758 10 0.760 12
3 Late or delayed contract award by owner 0.593 45 0.536 50 0.526 49 0.552 49
4 Late reviewing and approval of design documents 0.620 44 0.608 42 0.600 43 0.609 44
5 Difference between selected bid and consultants’ estimates 0.552 49 0.592 43 0.662 32 0.602 45
6 Delays in decision-making 0.733 19 0.746 23 0.702 24 0.727 18
7 Unrealistic design development period 0.653 40 0.738 25 0.714 20 0.702 30
8 Late issue of instructions 0.703 29 0.677 35 0.718 17 0.700 31
9 Owner interference 0.717 24 0.669 39 0.643 35 0.676 35
10 Poor project scope definition by owner 0.767 12 0.762 15 0.753 11 0.761 11
11 Owner initiated changes during implementation 0.703 29 0.592 43 0.645 34 0.647 39
12 Awarding of contracts primarily on price 0.772 11 0.776 12 0.823 5 0.791 6
13 Corruption and bribery during the bidding and contract award phase 0.857 4 0.800 5 0.809 6 0.822 4
14 Poor information dissemination by owner 0.640 42 0.685 34 0.679 29 0.668 36
Contractor-related factors
15 Late payment of subcontractors for completed works by contractor 0.827 6 0.769 13 0.716 19 0.770 10
16 Fluctuations in material, labour and plant cost 0.669 38 0.631 41 0.609 41 0.636 41
17 Contractor’s cash-flow constraints 0.867 1 0.815 4 0.842 2 0.841 3
18 Underestimation of project cost 0.867 1 0.877 1 0.836 3 0.860 1
19 Shortage of skilled labour 0.793 8 0.762 15 0.786 9 0.780 8
20 Increase in material cost 0.683 33 0.585 45 0.595 45 0.621 42
21 Delay by subcontractor 0.673 35 0.672 38 0.636 38 0.661 37
22 Poor site management and supervision 0.747 16 0.862 2 0.832 4 0.813 5
23 Underestimation of time for completion by contractor 0.793 8 0.777 10 0.791 7 0.787 7
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ID Causes of failure
Owner Contractors Consultants All parties
RII Rank RII Rank RII Rank Average RII Rank
24 Contractor work overload 0.720 23 0.715 31 0.712 21 0.716 27
25 Lack of experience in executing projects 0.867 1 0.824 3 0.870 1 0.853 2
26 Unforeseen ground conditions 0.673 35 0.577 46 0.614 40 0.621 42
27 Inclement weather 0.513 50 0.546 49 0.507 50 0.522 49
28 Poor planning of material acquisition (shortage of available steel, concrete) 0.697 31 0.792 7 0.691 25 0.727 18
29 Poor risk management by contractor 0.733 19 0.704 33 0.740 13 0.726 21
30 Inadequate contingency allowance 0.587 47 0.569 47 0.595 45 0.584 48
31 Defective works and reworks 0.752 15 0.754 20 0.750 12 0.752 15
32 Incompetent subcontractor 0.747 16 0.731 28 0.791 7 0.756 14
33 Lack of effective communication by contractor 0.747 16 0.715 31 0.712 21 0.725 23
34 Deficiencies in the initial bill of materials 0.707 25 0.738 25 0.641 36 0.695 32
Consultant-related factors
35 Discrepancy between design specification and building code 0.673 35 0.677 35 0.600 43 0.650 38
36 Incomplete designs by engineering disciplines 0.833 5 0.762 15 0.718 17 0.771 9
37 Incomplete design by architect 0.807 7 0.731 28 0.738 14 0.759 13
38 Poor quality of tender documents 0.707 25 0.754 20 0.738 14 0.733 17
39 Poor design capacity 0.733 19 0.762 15 0.676 31 0.724 24
40 Non-adherence to project schedule 0.707 25 0.777 10 0.595 45 0.693 33
41 Complexity of building design 0.587 47 0.677 35 0.536 48 0.600 46
42 Delays in issuing information to contractors 0.690 32 0.762 15 0.686 26 0.713 28
43 Owner-initiated changes during design 0.593 45 0.562 48 0.609 41 0.588 47
44 Lack of project coordination and integration 0.647 41 0.754 20 0.709 23 0.703 29
45 Poor project conceptualisation and design 0.680 34 0.800 5 0.686 26 0.722 25
46 Poor project scope definition by owner 0.660 39 0.785 9 0.735 16 0.726 21
47 Risk identification and allocation 0.628 43 0.646 40 0.636 38 0.637 39
48 Poor constructability 0.733 19 0.746 23 0.679 29 0.720 26
49 Poor stipulation of quality parameters 0.707 25 0.728 30 0.638 37 0.691 34
50 Lack of effective communication by consultants 0.793 8 0.733 27 0.656 33 0.727 18
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The RII of each cause, as perceived by all respondents, was used 
to illustrate the relative ranking. The results revealed that the three 
groups of respondents differ in the factors they identified as causing 
construction projects failure in the NW DPWR and in their ranking.
4.1.1 Owners’ viewpoints
The top five causes of construction projects failure in the NW DPWR 
identified by the owner representatives were the following:
• Contractor’s cash-flow constraints;
• Underestimation of project cost;
• Lack of experience in executing projects;
• Corruption and bribery during the bidding and contract 
award phase, and
• Incomplete designs by engineering disciplines.
4.1.2 Contractors’ viewpoints
The contractors perceived the top five major causes of construction 
projects failure in the NW DPWR to be the following:
• Underestimation of project cost;
• Poor site management and supervision;
• Lack of experience in executing projects;
• Contractor’s cash-flow constraints, and
• Corruption and bribery during the bidding and contract 
award phase.
4.1.3 Consultants’ viewpoints
The top five causes of construction projects failure in the NW DPWR 
identified by the consultants were the following:
• Lack of experience in executing projects;
• Contractor’s cash-flow constraints;
• Underestimation of project cost;
• Poor site management and supervision, and
• Awarding of contracts primarily on price.
Notably, consultants did not rank any consultant-related factors in 
the top five.
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4.1.4 Overall viewpoints
The top five overall views of all three parties to the survey were as 
follows:
• Owner and contractors ranked underestimation of project 
cost by the contractor as the major cause of construction 
projects failure in the NW DPWR;
• Owner and consultants ranked contractors’ lack of 
experience in executing projects as the major cause of 
construction projects failure;
• Owner and consultants ranked contractors’ cash-flow 
constraints as another major cause of construction projects 
failure in the NW DPWR;
• According to owner and contractors, corruption and bribery 
during the bidding and contract award phase by the owner 
is among the major causes of construction projects failure in 
the NW DPWR, and
• Based on their viewpoints, contractors claimed that poor 
project conceptualisation and design are major causes of 
project failure.
All three parties agree that the following causes are the least 
important:
• Inclement weather;
• Late or delayed contract award by owner;
• Inadequate contingency allowance by the contractor;
• Owner-initiated changes, and
• Complexity of building design.
4.2 Spearman Rank Correlation and p-values
Table 4 provides the values of correlation coefficients among the 
parties and their corresponding p-values.
Table 4: Correlation test of all factors among respondents













0.694 0.000 0.736 0.000 0.763 0.000
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The rank correlation coefficients calculated for all factors among 
the respondents were: 0.694 for “owner and contractors”; 0.736 for 
“contractors and consultants” and 0.763 for “owner and consultants”, 
respectively. These values show that there is a positive correlation 
between the three groups. The p-values for the three groups were 
0.000, denoting a significant relationship between the causes of 
construction project failure ranked by these three respondent 
groups. All the groups generally agreed on the ranking of the causes 
of construction projects failure in the NW DPWR.
5. Conclusions
Table 5 reveals the overall ranking of the top ten most important 
factors causing construction projects failure in the NW DPWR. All the 
major stakeholders agreed that seven out of the top ten causes of 
construction projects failure are linked to contractor-related factors. 
Four of the top five causes of construction projects failure in the 
NW DPWR are all contractor related. The highest ranked owner-
related cause of construction projects failure is corruption and 
bribery during the bidding and contract award phase; incomplete 
designs by engineering disciplines is the highest ranked consultant-
related factor. All the top ten factors are linked to the traditional 
view of project success/failure, which hinges on the ‘iron triangle’ 
parameters of time, cost and quality.
Table 5: Top ten factors causing failure of construction projects
ID Causes of failure Average RII Rank
Related 
category
18 Underestimation of project cost 0.860 1 Contractor
25 Lack of experience in executing projects 0.853 2 Contractor
17 Contractor’s cash flow constraints 0.841 3 Contractor
13 Corruption and bribery during the bidding and contract award phase 0.822 4 Owner
22 Poor site management and supervision 0.813 5 Contractor
12 Awarding of contracts primarily on price 0.791 6 Owner
23 Underestimation of time for completion by contractor 0.787 7 Contractor
19 Shortage of skilled labour 0.780 8 Contractor
36 Incomplete designs by engineering disciplines 0.771 9 Consultant
15 Late payment of subcontractors for completed works by contractor 0.770 10 Contractor
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6. Recommendations
Given the results of the research the following recommendations are 
proposed:
• The NW DPWR should be wary of awarding tenders where the 
price of the recommended tender is below the pre-tender 
estimate by the quantity surveyor. The reason for low tender 
values could be due to various reasons such as desperation 
to get a contract and substitute the price with change order 
or an underestimation of the price of the works.
• Contractors should critically evaluate their ability and 
competency to successfully complete the required 
assignment. It is important for contractors to ensure that they 
understand the requirements of the project during the pre-
contract and bidding period so that they go for works for 
which they have a competitive advantage.
• Contractors’ cash flow should be evaluated prior to bud 
evaluation and should also be part of the evaluation criteria.
• Consultants should be encouraged to improve upfront 
planning. A schedule should be set to complete design 
documents on time, and the Department must ensure that 
they adhere to the agreed schedule in order to avoid delay of 
work completion. An agreed turnaround time for document 
reviews should be confirmed upon project kick-off.
• All parties should put in place policies that will help retain 
their valuable human resources thereby avoiding high staff 
turnover.
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